Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists by Byerly, T.R.
Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists
T. Ryan Byerly1
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Keywords Theodicy . Free will . Causal determinism .Molinism
It is a widespread view in contemporary philosophy of religion that theists should adopt
a libertarian theory of free action according to which there are free actions and free
actions cannot be causally determined.1 This is because, by doing so, theists will be far
better equipped to respond to the most important objection to theism—the problem of
evil—than if they do not. The ubiquity of this narrative is certainly due, in part, to the
influential work of authors Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, and John Hick who
have articulated well-developed and highly regarded theodicies according to which it
either could be or plausibly is the case that God could not achieve certain goods without
permitting evils.2 The goods these authors have in mind are freedom goods—goods
only achievable via free action on the part of creatures—and the evils they have in mind
include both evils for which created agents are morally responsible (i.e., moral evils)
and evils for which created agents are not morally responsible (i.e., natural evils).3 In
the course of presenting their theodicies, these authors all explicitly affirm a libertarian
theory of free action. Their doing so has given the impression that this commitment to
libertarianism is required in order to advance their theodicies. And, because of the
promise of their theodicies, many have concluded that theists who hope for a response
to the problem of evil are best off being libertarians.
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1This is evidenced by, for example, the 2009 Philpapers Survey, which revealed that a disproportionate
percentage of philosophers inclined toward theism are also inclined toward libertarianism. The results of the
survey are available at philpapers.org.
2For a detailed presentation of the role that these authors’ work has played in bringing it about that the view
that theists should be libertarians is so common, see (Speak and Timpe 2016).
3For my purposes here, it will not be necessary to distinguish these categories from a potential third category
of social evil [on the latter, see (Poston 2014)]. This is because my aim is to show that the theodicies offered by
the authors with whom I engage can be adapted by theological determinists to account for the same kinds of
evils that these authors have in view, and these authors have in view only moral and natural evils.
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In this paper, I will challenge the view that libertarianism is necessary in order to
adopt the theodicies of Plantinga, Swinburne, and Hick.4 I will show that a theist who
affirms that all the free actions that exist are causally determined (a theological
determinist, as I will stipulatively define the view)5 can adopt quite a lot from the
approaches of these authors. More specifically, she can employ the basic argumentative
strategies most central to these authors’ projects in order to offer accounts of why it
could have been or plausibly is the case that God could not have achieved certain
freedom goods without permitting various moral and natural evils. She can use their
strategies, that is, to offer free will theodicies. I will not argue that by employing these
strategies she will achieve free will theodicies that are equally as plausible as any free
will theodicy a libertarian can offer. Nor will I argue that in every particular case in
which she adopts the strategies of Plantinga, Swinburne, and Hick, she is able to
produce a free will theodicy for certain particular evils that is equally as attractive as the
corresponding free will theodicy these authors are able to produce by using these
strategies; though I think in many cases, she straightforwardly can do so and I will
indicate where this is so below. My more modest aim, instead, is to show how
theological determinists can make a promising start toward developing free will
theodicies by adapting the strategies of these authors. The full development and
evaluation of the free will theodicies for theological determinists that I articulate here
is a task I hope to prompt readers to join me in pursuing in the near future.
My strategy for fulfilling this aim will be to engage with central argumentative
strategies from the theodicies of each of the three authors one by one, beginning in the
next section with John Hick. I should note here that I will not be engaging with each
author’s entire body of theodicy-relevant work. Rather, there are certain central aspects
of their theodicy-relevant work that I believe are particularly promising starting points
for theological determinists, and I will be focusing on those aspects. For Plantinga, I
focus on his appeal to Molinism in order to offer a defense for moral evils. For
Swinburne, I focus on his attempt to extend the free will defense to account for natural
evils. And, for Hick, I focus on his appeal to character formation to account for natural
evils. For each author, I present the basic argumentative strategy of the relevant part of
his work and then show how that strategy could be employed by a theological
determinist to offer a corresponding free will theodicy.
Character Formation Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists
Of the three authors considered in this paper, the one whose commitment to a
libertarian conception of free action is least obvious is John Hick. Perhaps for that
4 Some other authors have attempted to challenge this view as well, but not in the way I do here. See, e.g.,
(Judisch 2008), (Turner 2013), and (Almeida forthcoming).
5 The term ‘theological determinism’ is often used with a different meaning, requiring that all contingent facts
are determined by the divine will. This is not a requirement of ‘theological determinism’ as I have defined it;
however, much of what I will say in the paper is still relevant for such views. One important point of difference
is that only a ‘theological determinist’ in my stipulative sense, and not in this other sense, can affirm the
compatibilist Molinist view I discuss in BGreater Moral Goods Free Will Theodicies for Theological
Determinists^ section.
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reason, it will also be easiest to see how a theological determinist can adopt central
aspects of his free will theodicy.6
As Dan Speak (2013) helpfully points out, Hick’s commitment to libertarianism
comes out most clearly in his discussion on the freedom of human persons to respond
in love to God. For Hick, God cannot ensure that human persons will respond to him
with the most valuable kind of love. This is because the kind of freedom necessary for
this most valuable loving response requires that the response not be causally deter-
mined. As Hick explains, ‘Whilst a free action [of the kind in view here] arises out of
the agent’s character it does not arise in a fully determined and predictable way. It is
largely but not fully prefigured in the previous state of the agent. For the character is
itself partially formed and sometimes partially re-formed in the very moment of free
decision (1978: 276).’ The fact that Hick affirms libertarianism here may lead some
readers to think that adopting the central elements of his theodicy requires affirming
libertarianism. At the very least, it is plausible that Hick himself is thinking of his
claims about free action throughout his theodicy as involving a libertarian understand-
ing. That is, when he discusses free action throughout his theodicy, it is plausible that
he intends to be understood as referring to action types the occurrence of which is
incompatible with causal determinism. Nonetheless, it is worth our while to consider
whether central aspects of his theodicy could nonetheless be adapted by theological
determinists, who by definition deny libertarianism and instead affirm compatibilism—
the view that free actions can be causally determined.
The central aspect of Hick’s theodicy on which I will focus, and probably the aspect
for which his theodicy is best known, is his appeal to character formation, or soul-
building, to account for natural evils. Hick argues that God must permit natural evils of
the sort we find in our world if God is to achieve a world in which human persons
engage in free acts whereby they inculcate virtuous characters. This is because, as Hick
puts it, persons can only develop virtuous characters through their own free decisions if
they are placed in an environment which includes ‘challenges to be met, problems to be
solved, dangers to be faced, and which accordingly involves real possibilities of
hardship, disaster, failure, defeat, and misery (2001: 276).’ It is only in such an
environment, he claims, that persons can ‘develop in intelligence and in such qualities
as courage and determination (ibid).’ Yet, acquiring a virtuous character via one’s own
free decisions leads to the most valuable kind of moral goodness, Hick maintains.
Indeed, his theodicy is based on the principle that ‘virtues which have been formed
within the agent as a hard won deposit of his own right decisions in situations of
challenge and temptation, are intrinsically more valuable than virtues created within
him ready made and without any effort on his own part (271).’ In summary, Hick offers
a free will theodicy according to which the freedom good of virtuous character formed
through free actions productive of virtue is made achievable only by God’s permission
of natural evils. God plausibly would permit the natural evils that occur in our world
because permitting them is required in order for this freedom good to be achieved.
This aspect of Hick’s soul-building theodicy has been subjected to a variety of
objections, which I will not rehearse here.7 I note only that in contemporary discussions
of the problem of evil, Hick’s theodicy continues to receive serious attention and is seen
6 For another paper that argues that Hick’s theodicy does not require libertarianism, see (Pereboom 2012).
7 For a survey, see the relevant section of (Gelinas 2009).
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as a viable contender for at least contributing to a multifaceted theistic response to the
problem of evil.8 If this aspect of his theodicy could be deftly adapted by theological
determinists, this would make an important contribution to challenging the ubiquitous
contemporary view that theists should be libertarians in order to adequately respond to
the problem of evil. Theists could affirm theological determinism and employ an
adaptation of Hick’s free will theodicy to account for at least certain evils.
As it turns out, it is not difficult to see how a theological determinist could adapt this
aspect of Hick’s theodicy. For, she too may affirm that inculcating a virtuous character
by means of performing free acts productive of virtue is a great freedom good.
Moreover, she may think this is a freedom good that can only be achieved by God
through permitting evils to occur. For, like Hick, she may think that it is only an
environment in which there are challenges to be met, problems to be solved, and
dangers to be faced that these character-forming actions can take place. The only
difference between her and Hick is that she thinks that those free actions created agents
perform in response to these evils are acts that are causally determined to occur. Hick
may say these acts are for this reason not free, or do not exhibit the most valuable sort
of freedom. But, since the theological determinist affirms that free action is compatible
with causal determinism, she needs not concede this point. She may instead maintain
that these causally determined acts are indeed free, and perhaps even that they exhibit
the most valuable kind of freedom, and as such the goods achieved through them are
freedom goods. According to her Hick-inspired free will theodicy, God permits certain
natural evils because permitting them is required in order to make it possible for created
persons to achieve the freedom good of cultivating a virtuous character through their
own free decisions.
There is also a way in which the theological determinist might extend Hick’s soul-
building theodicy to at least partially account for some moral evils. For, while Hick
focuses primarily on natural evils as those evils required in order for persons to
cultivate virtuous characters via free action, one might think that there are certain
virtues which are such that they can only be inculcated through free decisions if there
are moral evils. In other words, there are some virtues that can only be developed in
response to moral evils. Forgivingness and contrition are often thought of in this way.9
Whereas forgivingness disposes its possessor to respond well to moral evils done
against her or against those to whom she is appropriately related, contrition disposes
its possessor to respond well to moral evils done by her or by those to whom she is
appropriately related. The theological determinist might then argue that certain moral
evils are permitted by God at least in part because the occurrence of these moral evils is
required in order for the perpetrators and victims of these evils to have an opportunity
to develop virtues such as forgivingness and contrition through free actions productive
of these virtues.10 Thus, the theological determinist can employ Hick’s argumentative
strategy to at least partially account for both some natural evils and some moral evils.
8 See, e.g., the featured treatments in (Gelinas 2009) and (Speak 2013).
9 For a recent survey of philosophical literature about forgivingness, see (McNaughton and Gerrard 2014).
10 It is important to note here and elsewhere that a freedom good may contribute to the explanation for God’s
permission of an evil without being the only reason for which that evil was permitted. Indeed, some
philosophers have argued that God does everything, God does for every good reason, and God has to do it.
See, e.g., (Pruss 2013).
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Now, one might object that this theological determinist adaptation of Hick’s soul-
building theodicy is not as plausible as Hick’s libertarian version. For, the theological
determinist version fails to explain why it is that once the evils required for the free
cultivation of virtue occur, created persons responding to these evils do not simply go
on every last time to perform good free acts. Since the actions they take in the face of
natural evils can be determined, one might have expected that God would ensure that
only good acts are performed in every case. Yet, by contrast, on Hick’s view, these free
acts cannot be determined, and so it is not surprising that good responses to natural
evils do not always occur. Thus, Hick’s version of the soul-building theodicy is
significantly more plausible than the theological determinist version.
While tempting, this particular objection to the above adaptation of Hick’s soul-
building theodicy is a red herring. The objector complains that the theological deter-
minist version of this particular aspect of Hick’s soul-building theodicy does not
explain why created persons sometimes choose evil rather than good when faced with
natural (and perhaps moral) evils required to give them an opportunity to develop their
souls. But these moral evils—the evils of choosing badly when given opportunities to
develop our souls—are not what the relevant aspect of the soul-building theodicy is
designed to explain, supposing that these moral evils are not also among those required
to provide created persons with opportunities for cultivating virtue. This is the case
whether this aspect of the soul-building theodicy is wielded by Hick or by the
theological determinist. For, regardless of who is employing this aspect of the theodicy,
it is only designed to explain those evils that are required to provide created persons
with opportunities to develop their souls. If there are other evils not required for
providing created persons with opportunities for soul-building, such as evils that
created persons perform by choosing to not respond well to natural evils, these must
be accounted for through some other means.
This is not to say that Hick offers no such means anywhere else in the body
of his work concerned with the problem of evil.11 Nor is it to say that the
theological determinist who adapts Hick’s soul-building theodicy is not under
pressure to account for these evils in some other way as well. She very much
is, and in BGreater Moral Goods Free Will Theodicies for Theological
Determinists^ section below, I will discuss two strategies she might employ
in order to do so. The point here is simply that the aspect of the soul-building
theodicy on which I have been focusing and the aspect which has been by
itself enormously influential did not address these evils. As such, it is an equal
opportunity theodicy, available to the theological determinist just as much as to
the libertarian, and useful for at least partially accounting for some though not
all evils. The evils that it is useful for explaining, for both the libertarian and
11 Though it is less than straightforward to identify Hick’s view on the matter, a plausible interpretation of his
view is that these moral evils are, or might be, required if human persons are to freely enter the most valuable
kind of relational union with God, even if they are not required for human persons to freely cultivate their
characters in the way discussed in the text (cf Speak 2013). Exactly how to defend the conclusion that such
moral evils are required if God is to achieve a world in which human persons freely enter into union with Him
is a difficult question to which several answers might be offered. I discuss resources relevant to developing one
answer to it in BGreater Moral Goods Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists^ section and argue
that these resources can be adapted by theological determinists. I discuss resources relevant to offering another
answer to it more briefly in BConclusion^ section, explaining that these resources cannot be adopted by theists
committed to the doctrine of classical omniscience.
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the theological determinist, are those evils required to provide created persons
with opportunities for freely cultivating virtues. This central aspect of Hick’s
work, then, can be employed to develop a character formation free will
theodicy for theological determinists.
Moral Knowledge Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists
I turn next to a central aspect of the free will theodicy of Richard Swinburne.
Specifically, I will focus on his free will theodicy for natural evils. I will
identify four ways in which his strategy for arguing that natural evils are
required for freedom goods can be adapted by theological determinists to
account for both natural and moral evils.
Swinburne states very clearly in his seminal article on the topic of natural evil the
commitment to libertarianism invoked by the standard free will defense. He writes,
‘The free-will defense claims that God might well give to men a kind of free will in
which how an agent acts is not fully determined by preceding causes but depends, at
least in part, on the agent’s uncaused choice at the instant of action (1978: 295).’
Swinburne shares, and intends to be understood as sharing, this commitment to
libertarianism. His stated thesis shows that the free will defense ‘could only work in
providing an explanation for why God allows moral evil, if in fact there is also natural
evil (296).’ In other words, Swinburne maintains that the freedom goods in view in the
free will defense require the existence not only of moral evils but natural evils. As such,
it is clear that he has in mind a libertarian conception of free action when we offers his
free will theodicy for natural evil, since he is clear that the freedom goods in view in the
free will defense are achievable only given a libertarian theory of free action. Thus, it is
understandable that some readers may conclude that adopting libertarianism is essential
in order to appropriate the basic strategy of his theodicy for natural evil.
Swinburne’s free will theodicy for natural evil focuses on the freedom good of
exercising significant control. On Swinburne’s view, in order for human persons to
achieve the freedom good of exercising significant control, they must have knowledge
that some of their potential acts would result in goods while others of their potential acts
would result in bads. More colloquially, Swinburne is committed to the view thatmoral
knowledge is necessary for exercising significant control. This is because, in order to
exercise significant control in some domain, one must, in Swinburne’s terminology,
have the opportunity to perform both morally good and morally bad acts within that
domain. 12 If one only has the opportunity to perform morally good acts in some
domain, then the control over one’s life that one exercises in that domain is not
significant. However, if one is to have the opportunity to perform both morally good
and morally bad acts in a domain, then one must have knowledge that at least some of
one’s potential acts in that domain would lead to good and that some of one’s potential
acts would lead to bad. Swinburne argues, however, that no human person could have
knowledge that some of her potential acts would result in bads, and still have the
12 See his (1978: 300) for this usage of ‘opportunity.’ Charitably understood, Swinburne’s talk of ‘opportunity’
is probably equivalent to what others would call opportunity and ability.
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opportunity to do both good and evil, unless there were past natural evils. He argues, to
put it more colloquially, that natural evils are necessary for moral knowledge.13
To defend the claim that natural evils are necessary for moral knowledge, Swinburne
argues that human persons will have to obtain this moral knowledge on the basis of
induction from past cases, if they are to have the opportunity to do both good and evil.
For example, if a person is to have the knowledge necessary to exercise significant
control over her distribution of cyanide to others, she will have to know of past effects
of cyanide for good and ill. This moral knowledge must be obtained via induction
because the only other route to obtaining it would be on the basis of direct divine
revelation, which would put persons in a position where they no longer have the
opportunity to do both good and evil. Direct divine revelation would prevent persons
from having the opportunity to do evil, Swinburne maintains, because such revelation
would put its recipients in a position where they would have no reason to do otherwise
than the good, since they would be constantly aware of God’s looking over their
shoulders. Yet, in order to have the opportunity to do both good and evil, one must
have both reason to act the way one acts and reason to perform a moral alternative. So,
moral knowledge must be achieved via induction from past cases.
Moreover, the past cases from which human persons gain the inductive moral
knowledge necessary for exercising significant control must include natural evils. They
cannot all be cases of moral evil. This is because, for each kind of moral evil, there must
have been a first instance when that moral evil was committed. But, then, given that this
moral evil was an exercise of significant control, which it must have been,14 it must
have been that the person who committed the evil had the moral knowledge necessary
for exercising significant control. The person who committed the first moral evil of
cyanide poisoning, for example, must have known that his giving cyanide to his victim
with the intent to kill would result in his victim’s death. However, he could not have
had this knowledge on the basis of past instances of intentional cyanide poisonings for
which some created agent was morally responsible, since, ex hypothesi, this is the first
instance of such poisoning. It must have been, instead, that he knew that his giving his
victim cyanide with the intent to kill would result in his victim’s death because of past
instances in which accidental ingestion of cyanide had led to death. His moral knowl-
edge must have been based on knowledge of past natural evils, in other words. And in
order for his knowledge of these instances of cyanide ingestion to ground his relevant
13 This abbreviated remark may lead some readers to think that I am here failing to note an important
development in Swinburne’s thinking about the relationship between natural evil and moral knowledge.
Specifically, while Swinburne early in his career maintained that natural evil was necessary for moral
knowledge, he later retreated to the weaker view that permitting natural evil is only the best way for God to
ensure that moral knowledge is attained [see (Gelinas 2009) for discussion of this development, with
references]. However, the view expressed in the text is crafted to avoid this mistake. What is being affirmed
in the text is not simply that natural evil is necessary for moral knowledge, but rather that natural evil is
necessary if moral knowledge that enables the exercise of significant control to be achieved. One of the
reasons Swinburne thinks that it is best for moral knowledge to be achieved via natural evil is that this is the
only way for moral knowledge to be achieved so that it still enables the exercise of significant control.
14 It is important to briefly note the relationship between moral good, moral evil, and exercising significant
control. Exercising significant control is necessary for any moral good or moral evil, and any exercise of
significant control is either a moral good or a moral evil. This also illuminates the relationship between
significant control and moral responsibility. Since all acts for which a person is morally responsible are either
moral goods or moral evils, all acts for which a person is morally responsible are acts whereby she exercises
significant control.
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moral knowledge regarding the potential effects of his own distributions of cyanide, the
sample of accidental cyanide deaths of which he knows must be fairly robust. For, as
Swinburne explains at length, the inductive sample of evils on which one’s moral
knowledge is based will yield surer knowledge to the extent that this sample includes
a larger number of evils and to the extent that these evils are closer in proximity to the
agent’s experience.
Finally, Swinburne argues that the range of past known natural evils that there are
expands the range of significant control that human persons can exercise. This is
because the range of past known natural evils that there are expands the range of
ways that human persons have opportunity to benefit or harm themselves and others.
If, for example, the only past natural evils there have been were accidental deaths from
cyanide ingestion, then knowledge of past natural evils can only yield to human
persons the opportunity to exercise significant control with respect to their acts of
cyanide distribution. However, if human persons also know of many other, diverse past
natural evils, this can yield a wider range of opportunities to exercise significant
control. Swinburne maintains that a good God would presumably place some limit
on the range of opportunities that human persons have to inflict or avoid inflicting harm
on one another. Yet, it is not obvious, he claims, that the range of opportunities that
human persons in fact have in our world to harm or avoid harming one another is
beyond what a good God would allow.
Let the foregoing suffice as a presentation of central themes from Swinburne’s free
will theodicy for natural evils. My proposal here is that this theodicy from Swinburne,
while developed from an explicitly libertarian perspective, can nonetheless straightfor-
wardly be appropriated by a theological determinist. Indeed, the basic strategy of
Swinburne surveyed here can be employed by the theological determinist to at least
partially account not only for natural evils of the kind Swinburne has in mind but also,
with modifications, for certain evils brought about through human activity, including
many moral evils. I will identify four ways in which Swinburne’s strategy can be
fruitfully adapted by theological determinists.
First, the theological determinist can employ Swinburne’s strategy to account for
natural evils of the same kind that Swinburne has in mind. With Swinburne, she too can
affirm that exercising significant control—albeit of a compatibilist variety—requires
satisfying a certain epistemic condition, such as reaching a threshold of evidence
concerning the potential effects of one’s acts for good and ill. Those theological
determinists can affirm the necessity of an epistemic condition for exercising significant
control is abundantly clear from recent literature discussing the epistemic condition on
moral responsibility. As Timpe writes, ‘most extant accounts of moral responsibility,’
whether they affirm that free action is compatible with causal determinism or not, ‘have
two things in common: a control condition and an epistemic condition (Timpe 2011:
5).’ The requirement of an epistemic condition on moral responsibility ‘cuts across the
traditional incompatibilist/compatibilist divide (6).’ Just as compatibilits, including
theological determinists, can affirm an epistemic condition on moral responsibility,
they can affirm an epistemic condition on exercising significant control: an agent can
only exercise significant control if she meets a threshold of evidence for thinking that
some of her potential acts would lead to goods and that others would lead to bads.15
15 See fn 12 on the relationship between moral responsibility and significant control.
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Moreover, with Swinburne, the theological determinist can also affirm that free
action requires that one has reason both for and against the act one chooses. Swinburne
gives no reason for thinking that his view about the relationship between free action
and reasons-possession is the unique provenance of libertarians. And, indeed, much of
the literature on developed compatibilist theories of free action is deeply concerned
with the relationship between reasons and free action.16 My simple suggestion here is
that the theological determinist adopts Swinburne’s own view that in order to perform a
morally good act freely, the actor must have both reason to perform that act and reason
to perform a wrong act instead. If the theological determinist adopts this view from
Swinburne, she can conclude, just as he does, that satisfying the epistemic condition
necessary for exercising significant control over our destinies will require the past
occurrence of natural evils. For, the only other alternative for satisfying this epistemic
condition would involve direct divine revelation, and such direct divine revelation
would ensure that persons only had reason to do what is right and did not have reason
to do what is wrong. Thus, just like Swinburne, the theological determinist can
maintain that in order for persons to exercise significant control over their destinies,
there must be past natural evil knowledge of which puts these persons in the appropri-
ate epistemic relation to the effects of their potential acts for good and ill while
preserving their freedom. This is a first way in which Swinburne’s strategy can be
adapted by theological determinists.
There are also three additional ways in which theological determinists can modify
Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy in order to account for certain evils brought about
through human activity, including moral evils. To see a first way, notice that when
making decisions about how to exercise control, we are not only concerned with how
our potential acts will affect the pleasure or pain experienced by others (which tends to
be the focus of Swinburne’s discussion) but also with whether our acts might influence
others to commit morally wrong acts or inspire them to perform morally right acts, to
develop virtuous or vicious characters.17 In other words, we are concerned with how we
exercise control over the influence we have on the moral quality of others’ lives. Yet,
following Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy, if we are to exercise significant control over
the influence we have on the moral quality of others’ lives, then we must possess
sufficient evidence concerning how our potential acts will influence the moral quality
of others’ lives for good or ill. We must, for instance, meet thresholds of evidence
concerning how our potential acts will influence the morally right or morally wrong
acts of others. Yet, satisfying this epistemic condition will need to be achieved through
induction from past cases, for the familiar reasons given above. Our evidence
concerning how our potential acts will influence others to perform moral rights or
wrongs, or to cultivate virtuous or vicious characters will be drawn from our knowledge
of past instances in which the behaviors of some human persons influenced other
human persons in these ways. However, it is clear that in order to have the requisite
16 I am thinking here, in particular, of reasons and reasons-responsive compatibilist theories. For an overview
of these, see (McKenna and Coates 2015, Sections 5.3 and 5.4).
17 Swinburne does, in fact, very briefly anticipate this point. He remarks, ‘Clearly too the greater the share in
his creative work which a God chooses to give to men, the greater the powers to benefit and to harm each other
he must give to them. He must for example not merely give men the power to bruise each other, but also give
ment he power to become heroin addicts, to persuade other men to become heroin addicts, and to drop atom
bombs (1978: 296, emphasis added).’
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kind of inductive sample of past instances in which the behaviors of some human
persons influenced others to perform moral wrongs or to develop vicious characters,
there must be past moral wrongs and past instances of vicious character development.
Thus, the resources of Swinburne’s theodicy can be straightforwardly adapted by
theological determinists to at least partially account for certain moral evils—specifical-
ly, moral evils the occurrence of which was influenced by the controllable behavior of
human persons other than the evildoer.
The resources of Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy can be further adapted by theo-
logical determinists to account for other moral evils that need not have been influenced
by the controllable behavior of human persons other than the evildoer. To see one way
in which this may be achieved, consider the act of identifying with certain features of
character rather than others. Identification with certain features of character, such as
patience, love, or thankfulness rather than others such as impatience, hatefulness, and
ingratitude plausibly plays a significant role in an agent’s self-creation—in the way she
governs what sort of persons he becomes. Acts of identification, then, are good
candidates for acts through which an agent can achieve the freedom good of exercising
significant control over her self-formation.18 Employing the resources of Swinburne’s
theodicy, however, theological determinists might argue that if acts of identification are
to make possible such freedom goods, then there must be past moral evils.
To see why Swinburne’s theodicy can be adapted to show that acts of identification
can lead to the freedom good of exercising significant control over one’s self-formation
only if there are past moral evils, we need to recall and apply four elements from
Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy surveyed above. First, given Swinburne’s theodicy, if
the act of identification is to be one whereby the agent exercises significant control,
then it must be that this act is performed in the face of an opportunity to perform both
an action of identification that would lead to a significant good and an action of
identification that would lead to a significant bad.19 Second, if the act of identification
was performed in the face of an opportunity to perform an action of identification that
would lead to a significant bad, then it must have been that this opportunity was an
opportunity to identify with features that tend to produce actions that lead to bads. For
plausibly, an action of identification will only lead to significant bads if it is an act of
identifying with features that tend to produce acts that lead to bads.20 However, third, if
the act of identification was performed in the face of an opportunity to identify with
features which tend to produce acts that lead to bads, then the actor must have known
that there were features with which she could identify which tend to produce acts that
lead to bads. And, fourth and finally, it will follow given Swinburne’s theodicy that
such knowledge could only be achieved via induction from past instances in which
such features produced acts that led to bads. For in order to know that identifying with a
18 Several compatibilists have employed acts of identification to account for various freedom goods. For
example, Bratman (2007) argues that the freedom good of autonomous action can only be achieved via acts of
identification.
19 When introducing Swinburne’s ideas above, I said that, on his view, for a person to exercise significant
control in a domain she must have opportunity to do good acts in that domain as well as opportunity to do bad
acts in that domain. Here, I apply this idea to the specific domain of acts of identification.
20 To be a bit more ecumenical here, one might allow that acts that ‘lead to’ bads can include acts that just are
bad. Swinburne himself tends not to distinguish acts that just are bad from acts that lead to, in a more strictly
causal sense, bads. As such, he appears to endorse a consequentialist account of bad action.
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certain feature will potentially result in acts brought about by that feature that lead to
bads, one must know of past instances in which this feature produced acts that led to
bads. If, for example, a person is to exercise significant control through identifying with
compassion for others rather than contempt, she must know of past instances in which
compassion or contempt produced actions that led to bads.
Moreover, it is plausible that these past instances in which the relevant feature is
known to have produced acts that led to bads must include moral evils. They cannot all
be instances in which this feature produced acts that led to bads, where no person was
morally responsible for those bads. For when a person decides to identify with a certain
feature rather than others, her decision just is a decision aimed at cultivating or
maintaining a character in which this feature rather than the others play the right sort
of role to give rise to actions over which she exercises significant control and so is
morally responsible. What she needs to know, then, is what kinds of actions this feature
tends to give rise to when it plays the right sort of role to give rise to actions over which
persons possessing it exercise significant control. But then, the past cases which give
rise to her knowledge must include past cases where the relevant feature gave rise to
moral evils—acts that led to bads for which the agent possessing the feature was
morally responsible. Thus, Swinburne’s theodicy can be adapted by theological deter-
minists to show that if there are to be freedom goods that require the exercise of
significant control through acts of identification, there must be moral evils.
We have seen, then, that Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy can be adapted by theo-
logical determinists in order to at least partially account not only for the same kinds of
natural evils that were the original topic of his theodicy but also for certain moral evils.
It can be adapted to account for moral evils which were brought about through the
influence of the behavior of human persons other than the evildoer, and it can be
adapted to account for moral evils that provide knowledge necessary for persons to
exercise significant control over their self-formation through acts of identification.
I propose a fourth and final way in which Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy can be
adapted by theological determinists to account for moral evils. Recall Swinburne’s view
that a person’s control over her destiny is expanded when she knows of a greater range
of past evils. We have, for example, greater control over our destinies if we know not
only of past instances of accidental cyanide poisonings but past instances in which
persons accidentally fell off of cliffs and were thereby injured. For, this knowledge
expands the range of morally significant options open to us. I propose that the
theological determinist might adapt this idea and propose that when a person knows
that she herself or another human person has performed a moral evil in the past, this can
uniquely expand the range of morally significant options available to her, thereby
expanding the range of freedom goods achievable by her.
To see why this proposal is attractive, begin by noticing that the epistemic position
in which a person stands to the good and bad effects of her potential acts comes in
degrees. Past instances in which cyanide has accidentally been ingested and death has
followed provide evidence that if one is to put cyanide in another’s drink intending his
death, he will die as a result. Enough past instances of accidental death by cyanide
ingestion may provide sufficient evidence for one to meet the threshold of evidence
necessary for satisfying the epistemic condition necessary for exercising significant
control over one’s behaviors with respect to cyanide. But, as Swinburne himself is
quick to admit, accidental deaths by cyanide do not provide as good evidence
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concerning the potential effects of putting cyanide in someone’s drink with the intent to
kill him as past instances in which either oneself or others put cyanide in someone’s
drink with the intent to kill him. For, in the latter instance, the cases which form the
inductive basis of one’s moral knowledge are more similar to one’s own experience.
Thus, if there are past cases in which human persons have intentionally given cyanide
to others with the intent of killing them (thus performing moral evils), this will provide
one with stronger evidence that if one is to intentionally give cyanide to someone with
the intent to kill, he will die as a result. However, possessing such strengthened
evidence, I propose, opens up a greater range of morally significant options for the
actor. This is because, other things being equal, the stronger the evidence one has for
thinking that acting with the intention of bringing about a bad will succeed in bringing
about the bad, the worse an action one performs when acting with the intention to bring
about that bad. For example, the stronger the evidence one has that giving cyanide with
the intent to kill brings about death, the worse an action one performs when one gives
cyanide with the intent to kill. Accordingly, more generally, when human persons have
evidence concerning the occurrence of moral evils committed by themselves or others,
this opens up a greater range of morally significant options to them. They can do worse
evils than they otherwise could, since they will have stronger evidence of the success of
their potential evil-aimed acts. They can, for example, commit acts of poisoning
knowing full well that the poisoning will lead to death and not just actions of poisoning
knowing pretty well that poisoning will lead to death.
Now, I do not intend to argue here for any particular view about exactly
how far a good God would aim to expand the range of morally significant
options available to human persons. I will not argue, for example, that we have
more reason to expect that this God would aim to give human persons the
option of performing moral evil acts of a type they know to have already been
committed than that this God would not aim to provide human persons with
this option. I simply note that knowing of past moral evils does uniquely
expand the range of morally significant options open to an actor, and, as
Swinburne himself affirms, it is not clear just how far a good God would
aim to expand the morally significant options for human persons. As he
affirms, there is presumably some limit, but it is difficult to say with much
confidence where we should expect this limit to fall. This is the final way of
adapting Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy; then, I take to only provide a weak
sort of theodicy. I do not take it to provide an account of why God plausibly
would permit the moral evils with which it is concerned, but only to provide
one reason why God might permit them. God might permit some moral evils
because doing so is necessary for expanding the range of significant control
that human persons can exercise, and it is a significant freedom good for
human persons to exercise expanded control.
Swinburne’s epistemic theodicy, then, proves especially fruitful for theolog-
ical determinists. They can adapt his theodicy to account for the same natural
evils that he is concerned with in almost exactly the way he does. They can
adapt it to at least partially account for moral evils which are influenced by the
behavior of persons other than the evildoer. They can employ it to at least
partially account for moral evils knowledge of which is necessary for achieving
freedom goods through acts of identification. And, they can employ it to offer a
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weak theodicy for moral evils knowledge of which expands the range of
morally significant control persons are able to exercise.
Greater Moral Goods Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists
The final theodicy I will address is that provided in Plantinga’s (1978) Molinist
response to the logical problem of evil. Plantinga only aims to provide a weak sort of
theodicy, an account of how it could be that God was unable to bring about a greater
balance of moral goods than moral evils without permitting some moral evils. This
weak sort of theodicy is often called a defense. Plantinga presents his defense as
explicitly committed to libertarianism. He writes, ‘If a person S is free with respect
to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain; no causal
laws and antecedent conditions determine either that he will perform the action, or that
he will not (Plantinga 1978: 167).’ However, I aim to show here two ways in which a
theological determinist might adapt Plantinga’s strategy to provide free will theodicies
of her own.
Plantinga’s basic strategy is to propose that it is possible that there is a
group of facts with two features. First, the truth value of the facts is indepen-
dent of divine volition. God cannot do anything about these facts; God simply
confronts the facts, we might say, at the logical moment of his creative
decision. Second, the facts are such that they ensure that if God is to create
a world containing certain kinds of freedom goods, God must permit there to
be moral evils. In particular, Plantinga proposes that the facts are such that they
ensure that if God is to create a world containing a greater balance of moral
goods (and, moral goods are by definition freedom goods) than moral evils,
God must permit some moral evils.
In Plantinga’s account, the facts that he proposes might have these two features are
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. These facts specify how created agents would
freely behave under a complete set of circumstances. As an illustration, one such fact
would report how you would freely behave in exactly the circumstances in which you
currently find yourself. On Plantinga’s view, there is a complete set of such facts in any
possible world. For any possible created agent S, any action A, and any complete set of
circumstances C, it is either true that were S in C, S would freely do A, or it is true that
were S in C, S would not freely do A. On Plantinga’s view, the truth values of these
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are not only independent of divine volition but
they can vary from one possible world to another. As we might put it, when God
decides to create, the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom happen to be one way,
though they could have been another, and the way they are is not up to God. Plantinga
proposes that it could have been that the complete set of counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom happened to have a combination of truth values such that if God is to create a
world containing more moral good than moral evil, God will have to permit moral
evils. Since it is not unreasonable to think God might prefer to create such a world
rather than to refrain from creating, it is not unreasonable to think that it might have
been that God created a world containing moral evils, because it was only by doing so
that he could create a world containing the freedom good of a greater amount of moral
goods.
Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists
My proposal here is that there are two ways in which a theological determinist can
adapt the basic strategy of Plantinga’s free will theodicy. The two ways differ with
respect to which facts the theological determinist proposes play the role played by the
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in Plantinga’s own theodicy.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the first proposal is that the facts that play the role
played by the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in Plantinga’s theodicy are these
very counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. In other words, the proposal is that theo-
logical determinists adopt all of the details of Plantinga’s proposal, except for his
commitment to libertarianism. We might call such a theological determinist a
compatibilist Molinist (since she thinks that free actions are compatible with causal
determinism), where we would call Plantinga an incompatibilist Molinist (since he
thinks free actions are incompatible with causal determinism).
As it turns out, compatibilist Molinism is not without motivation. Indeed,
some of the most challenging criticisms of Plantinga’s (and others’) Molinism
have argued that this Molinist view is inconsistent with an incompatibilist
theory of free action, and so inconsistent with the libertarian view that
Plantinga affirms. In particular, I have in mind arguments that conclude that
if there were true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, their truth would imply
that any free actions of creatures were compatible with causal determinism.21
These arguments proceed by noting that if there were true counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom, they would be past facts. But, the truth of these past facts,
together with the truth of past facts concerning God’s creative decisions to
actualize the circumstances specified in the antecedents of these counterfactuals
of creaturely freedom, entails that the free acts reported in the consequents of
these conditionals occur as they are reported. Thus, each so-called ‘free’ act is
the logical consequence of past facts. Yet, this is sufficient for the thesis of
causal determinism to be true, at least as it concerns ‘free’ acts. For, the thesis
of causal determinism simply states that each future fact is the consequence of
past facts and the laws of nature. Yet, any fact that is the consequence of past
facts alone is also the consequence of those past facts together with the laws of
nature, since logical consequence is monotonic (i.e., if p is a logical conse-
quence of q, then for any r, p is a logical consequence of q and r). Accord-
ingly, if the acts specified in the consequents of counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom really are free acts, then compatibilism is true. For, the occurrence of
these free acts is compatible with these acts being causally determined.
Incompatibilist Molinists of course have their responses to such arguments.
Nonetheless, such arguments are taken by many contemporary philosophers to
present a serious challenge to incompatibilist Molinism. My own impression is
that, typically, philosophers who find these arguments against incompatibilist
Molinism persuasive take this to be a reason to give up on pursuing the sort of
free will theodicy defended by Plantinga. Yet, a different option—the option
that interests me here—is the option of taking such arguments to instead
motivate compatibilist Molinism. Grant that these arguments succeed in show-
ing that the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom would entail that any
free acts are compatible with causal determinism. But keep Plantinga’s Molinist
21 For a recent defense of such arguments, see (Cohen 2015).
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free will theodicy. Simply affirm, as the theological determinist does, that all
the free acts that exist are causally determined.
On the compatibilist Molinist view I am proposing, God, in the moment of creative
decision, is confronted with the truth of a complete set of counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom. The truth values of these counterfactuals are not up to God. Indeed, as on
some incompatibilist Molinist views (e.g., Flint 1998), the counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom are simply brute facts.22 As with Plantinga’s Molinism, it could have been that
the combination of truth values of these counterfactuals of creaturely freedom was such
that God was only able to create a world containing the freedom good of a greater
balance of moral goods than moral evils if God permitted moral evils. And, as on
Plantinga’s Molinism, it is not unreasonable to think that God might have preferred,
given that this was how things were, to create a world containing more moral good than
moral evil than to not create at all. In this way, the theological determinist simply
employs Plantinga’s own story, minus its libertarianism, to explain how it could have
been that there were freedom goods God could only achieve by permitting moral evils.
How plausible is the compatibilist Molinist story in comparison to Plantinga’s
original incompatibilist Molinist story? The answer to this question will turn on
whether it is any less plausible for the theological determinist to affirm the existence
of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom with truth values independent of the divine
will than for the incompatibilist to do so. Exploring this topic in detail is, I think, a topic
ripe for further future exploration. It is not something I can attend to with sufficient care
here. Nonetheless, I will engage briefly with one attempt to show that incompatibilist
Molinism is on better footing in affirming these counterfactuals than is compatibilist
Molinism. 23 By doing so, I hope to illustrate that arguing for the superiority of
incompatibilist Molinism over compatibilist Molinism may not be as simple as some
readers may initially suspect.
One might think that the incompatibilist Molinist has the following significant
advantage over the compatibilist Molinist. She, but not her compatibilist cousin, can
offer a straightforward and attractive explanation of why the counterfactuals of crea-
turely freedom cannot be subject to the divine will. The explanation is just that these
counterfactuals are facts about the free acts of creatures. But, since the incompatibilist
Molinist is an incompatibilist, she will affirm that facts about the free acts of creatures
cannot be subject to the will of anyone other than those creatures they are about. And
so, these facts cannot be subject to the divine will. However, a compatibilist Molinist,
by contrast, cannot say that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be subject to
the divine will simply because they are facts about the free actions of creatures, and
facts about the free actions of creatures cannot be subject to the will of anyone other
than those creatures.
22 Perhaps, this does not entail that they are not up to human persons. I take it that the view of some
incompatibilist Molinists is precisely this: that these facts, while brute, are nonetheless up to those human
persons that they are about. I see no reason for thinking that a compatibilist Molinist could not affirm this very
same view. Indeed, the sense of ‘up to’ that is appealed to by incompatibilist Molinists in order to explain how
these brute facts are up to the persons they are about is one that is well in line with what traditional
compatibilist have said about how our actions are ‘up to’ us in the sense required for free action. See
discussion in (Flint 2009) on in what way these facts are ‘up to’ to persons they are about.
23 Thanks to Robert Hartman for raising this possibility in discussion.
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While tempting, this way of arguing that incompatibilist Molinism is more plausible
than compatibilist Molinism is misleading. There are lots of ways for facts to be about
the free actions of creatures. But, only some of these ways for facts to be facts about the
free actions of creatures are ways where it is more plausible given incompatibilism than
compatibilism that these facts cannot be up to the will of anyone other than those whom
the facts are about. In particular, what is plausible is that it is more plausible given
incompatibilism than compatibilism that facts that simply report that some creature
performed some free act cannot be up to the divine will, since they cannot be up to the
will of anyone other than the actor whom they are about. But, the counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom are not about free acts in this way. They do not simply report that
some creature performs some free act. Rather, they report what a creature would freely
do in a set of circumstances. And it is not at all clear why it would be more plausible
given incompatibilism than compatibilism that facts that are about the free actions of
creatures in this way cannot be subject to the divine will.
That this particular attempt to argue that incompatibilist Molinism provides a more
plausible free will theodicy than compatibilist Molinism fails does not entail that there
is no way to show that incompatibilist Molinism is more plausible than compatibilism
Molinism. Nonetheless, its failure does illustrate that arguing that incompatibilist
Molinism is superior to compatibilism Molinism may be more difficult than some
readers might initially assume. This should be enough to generate interest among
readers in pursuing the project of comparatively evaluating incompatibilist and
compatibilist versions of Molinism in the future. I offer, then, compatibilist Molinism
as one way in which theological determinists can adapt Plantinga’s strategy to offer a
free will theodicy.
Turn now to a second way in which theological determinists might adapt Plantinga’s
free will theodicy. On this approach, the facts that play the role played by the
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in Plantinga’s Molinist theodicy are not counter-
factuals of creaturely freedom. They are instead necessary truths constituted by or
derivable from laws of nature about human persons. They state, for example, that,
necessarily, if human persons develop in such a way as to form the kinds of complex
social arrangements necessary for producing freedom goods of collective exercises of
significant control, then these human persons will commit moral evils along the way.24
Or, they may instead make similar, more specific statements about particular human
persons in particular social arrangements necessary for particular exercises of collective
responsibility committing particular moral wrongs. When I refer to such facts as either
constituted by or derivable from laws of nature, I intend to be supposing a conception
of laws of nature, recently given much attention,25 according to which laws of nature
are more than mere Humean generalizations, but are instead made true by the nature of
those entities they are about. It is human nature, on this proposal, which accounts for
the truth of the laws from which the facts I have in mind are either constituted or
derived. On the view I am proposing, it is because human nature is the way that it is that
human persons cannot develop the kinds of complex social relations necessary for
24 The literature on the precise nature of collective action and responsibility is vast and complex [for an
overview, see (Smiley 2010)]. I do not intend here to adopt any particular theory of the nature of collective
action and responsibility, but simply to refer to the phenomena; however, they are best understood.
25 See, e.g., (Heil 2005) and (Bird 2007).
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achieving freedom goods of collective exercises of significant control without com-
mitting some moral evils.26 It is moreover proposed that these facts that are constituted
by or are derivable from facts about human nature have the two features of Plantinga’s
counterfactuals. They are independent of divine volition, and they are such that they
ensure that God is not able to bring about a world containing certain freedom goods
without permitting moral evils. The particular freedom goods that are in focus here are
freedom goods that require the collective exercise of significant responsibility. The
proposal, more fully, is that, in light of the facts about human nature, God could not
have achieved a world with a greater balance of moral goods than moral evils, where
the total set of moral goods included goods requiring collective exercises of significant
control, without permitting moral evils.27
We might call the foregoing adaptation of Plantinga’s free will theodicy the bad
human nature theodicy. One important way in which it differs from the compatibilist
Molinist theodicy is that it allows the theological determinist to maintain that all
contingent facts are subject to the divine will. This is because the facts that play the
role of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in this theodicy are not contingent facts.
This difference is worth pointing out because many who have been attracted to
theological determinism of the kind in view in this paper have also wished to maintain
that all contingent facts are subject to the divine will. Indeed, the term ‘theological
determinism’ is frequently reserved for just such a view.
If we wish to assess the comparative merits of this bad human nature theodicy versus
Plantinga’s original Molinist theodicy, the central question will concern whether it is
more plausible to affirm the existence of Plantinga’s counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom than to affirm the existence of the facts featured in the bad human nature
theodicy. We have already seen that there is a large literature devoted to assessing the
plausibility of affirming the existence of Plantinga’s counterfactuals, including argu-
ments aiming to show that their existence is implausible, or that it is implausible given
incompatibilism. My focus here will be on assessing the plausibility of the facts
featured in the bad human nature theodicy. And, while I cannot offer a completely
thorough assessment of the plausibility of their existence here, I will offer some
comments in favor of their plausibility and respond to some objections to their
plausibility, inviting readers to join with me in more fully evaluating these consider-
ations and others in the near future.
One important observation on behalf of the existence of the facts featuring in the bad
human nature theodicy is the empirical evidence. Every known historical instance of a
26 It may be that it is possible for human beings to eventually develop to a point where they can engage in
collective exercises of significant control without any longer committing moral evils—that human beings are
perfectable, in other words—but the present proposal is that the road to such perfectability necessarily includes
moral evils.
27 One might object here that the language of ‘permission’ is at best misleading. Surely, the God of the bad
human nature theodicy is doing something other than or more than merely permitting or allowing moral
evils—this God contributes in a more positive causal way to bringing these evils about. Readers who find this
line of objection persuasive are invited to replace the language of ‘permission’ used here with alternative
language, such as the language of ‘bringing about.’ The debate about the best way to understand what it is to
permit or allow something, and whether the God of the bad human nature theodicy is best described as
permitting moral evils, is not a debate on which I intend to take a stand. For a defense of the claim that such a
God is best described as permitting or allowing moral evils, see Helm’s contributions in (Hasker and Helm
2004).
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human community that has developed the kinds of social arrangements necessary for
collective exercises of significant responsibility has been one in which moral evils were
committed along the way to this social formation. The facts that feature in the bad
human nature theodicy provide a powerful explanation of this empirical evidence. The
reason every known historical case in which a human community has developed the
kinds of social arrangements necessary for collective exercises of significant responsi-
bility has been one in which moral evils have been committed along the way is that this
is simply part of human nature. This is how things have to be for human persons, given
the way human persons are. (Indeed, more broadly, the advocate of the bad human
nature theodicy will likely go even further to claim that this is how things must be for
created beings capable of collective exercises of significant control more generally. For,
the only empirical evidence we have concerning any beings of this kind indicates that
none of those beings can achieve freedom goods of collective exercises of significant
control without committing moral evils along the way. Yet, it is difficult to identify a
reason for thinking that human beings are unique in this respect among other creatable
beings—that there is special reason to think that humans would be bad. Indeed,
Plantinga’s own original Molinist theodicy treats human beings on part with other
creatable beings with respect to the kind of badness that features in his view—
transworld depravity. Likewise, an advocate of the bad human nature theodicy will
likely think that what she says for humans goes for other creatable beings as well—hers
is a ‘bad creatable beings’ theodicy.)
To just what extent does the empirical evidence favor the bad human nature
theodicy? One strategy for trying to show that it does not favor it substantially is to
argue that the bad human nature account of the relevant empirical evidence is less
attractive than accounts of this evidence only available to libertarians. And, indeed,
there is one especially common such explanation in the philosophical literature of
theists who are committed to libertarianism. It is the proposal that human nature as such
is not such as to make the facts featuring in the bad human nature theodicy true, but
rather that corrupted human nature is such as to make these facts true. And, this
corrupted human nature resulted as a consequence for moral evils committed by
uncorrupted human persons, where these moral evils involved the commission of free
acts that were incompatible with causal determinism. I am referring, of course, to a
libertarian understanding of the doctrine of the fall.28
One important reason for favoring this fallen human nature account of the relevant
empirical evidence is that it appears to cohere better with the fact that it is conceivable
that there be a society of human persons which develops the relations necessary for
collective exercises of significant control without there being moral evils committed
along the way. If conceivability is evidence for possibility, then the conceivability of
such a society provides evidence against the bad human nature explanation of the
relevant empirical data. For, the bad human nature account of the empirical evidence
entails that it is not possible that there would be a human society with the sorts of
relations necessary for exercises of significant responsibility without the members of
this society committing moral evils during its formation. The libertarian account of this
evidence, by contrast, is arguably consistent with the possibility of there being human
persons who achieve all manner of freedom goods without there being any moral evils.
28 For recent discussion of the doctrine of the fall, see (Crisp 2009).
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Indeed, this possibility was a shared commitment of both Plantinga and his interlocu-
tors at the time of his writing. Plantinga’s view was that it was possible that the
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom were such that God could not achieve a world
with certain freedom goods without there being moral evils, but, because these
counterfactuals are contingent, it was also possible that God could achieve a world
with those same freedom goods without there being moral evils. The latter possibility,
however, is denied by the bad human nature theodicy. At least, it is denied if the moral
goods are to include moral goods that require the collective exercise of significant
control. Accordingly, if conceivability is evidence of possibility, then there is evidence
favoring the libertarian, fallen human nature account of the relevant empirical evidence
over the bad human nature account.
There is of course a significant literature devoted to assessing whether and to what
extent conceivability is evidence for possibility.29 And within this literature, there are
dissenting and cautionary voices, urging us to take care about how quickly we grant
that something is possible because it is conceivable. There are also voices urging us to
take care with respect to what is required for something to be genuinely coherently
conceivable. And indeed, in the broader literature on theodicy, such cautionary voices
are often cited, particularly by those who defend natural law theodicies according to
which God’s creating a world with optimal laws of nature for enabling freedom goods
was not possible without evils of the sort found in our world. Notably, those who
defend such natural law theodicies are frequently explicitly committed to a libertarian
account of free action.30 Yet, I suggest here that these observations about the relation-
ship between conceivability and possibility can be employed equally fruitfully by the
advocate of the bad human nature theodicy to at least partially rebut the present
argument for favoring the fallen human nature account to her own.
Even if the defender of the bad human nature theodicy grants that the conceivability
of human societies in which there are freedom goods of collective exercises of
significant responsibility without moral evils is evidence for the possibility of this
and therefore evidence against her theodicy, she can still, in light of the foregoing
reservations about the relationship between conceivability and possibility, maintain that
this evidence is weak and defeasible. She might on this basis grant that while, given the
evidence from conceivability alone, her theological determinist theodicy is not equally
as plausible as Plantinga’s original, it is still worthy of further investigation. And, she
might attempt to show that there is counterevidence against conjoining Plantinga’s
original theodicy with the fallen human nature explanation of the empirical evidence of
moral evil which can neutralize the force of the evidence from conceivability that
favors his view over her adaptation.
Such counterevidence is not terribly difficult to locate. For instance, there are of
course classical objections to the fallen human nature account itself. It has proven
difficult, for example, for advocates of this view to provide an attractive account of how
it could be that corrupt human nature could be a consequence of the moral wrongdoing
of incorrupt human persons without requiring a view on which God unjustly punishes
some for the wrongdoing of others. One prominent view about how it is that the
wrongdoing of uncorrupt human persons leads to the corruption of human nature is that
29 See, e.g., (Hawthorne and Gendler 2001).
30 See, e.g., (van Inwagen 2006) and (Reichenbach 1982).
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the corruption of subsequent human nature is a divine punishment for this original
wrongdoing. But, if so, it seems this punishment is unjust, since persons who commit-
ted no wrong are made to have a corrupt nature on account of wrongs committed by
others. If, however, divine punishment is not the mechanism whereby the wrongdoing
of uncorrupt human persons leads to the corruption of subsequent human nature, one
wonders what this mechanism could be.
Additionally, there is a concern about conjoining Plantinga’s original theodicy with
the fallen human nature view. For, there is a tension between Plantinga’s original theory
about the independence of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom with the way in which
the fallen human nature account of the empirical evidence of wrongdoing appears to
require that such facts be dependent on past human wrongdoing. Recall on Plantinga’s
original Molinist theodicy, the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that specify how
an agent would behave in a complete set of circumstances are not subject to the divine
will. Nor are they subject to the will of persons other than the human actor whom they
are about. Yet, the libertarian account of the empirical evidence of pervasive human
wrongdoing requires that this evidence is explained by the fact that all human persons
have corrupt natures, and their having corrupt natures is a consequence of the wrong-
doing of uncorrupt human persons. If, however, the fact that all human persons
subsequent to the original wrongdoers have corrupt natures is to explain the empirical
evidence for human wrongdoing, it will plausibly entail, and explain, counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom regarding these corrupt human wrongdoers. The reason it is the case
that were there to be a community of existing human persons which developed the
kinds of sophisticated arrangements necessary for collectively exercising significant
control, there would be wrongs committed along the way, is that all existing human
persons have corrupt natures as a result of the original human wrongdoers. But, then,
the truths of these counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are not, pace Plantinga’s
original theodicy, independent of the will of persons other than the persons they are
about. They are instead dependent on the original wrongdoers.
Given the strategies available to the advocate of the bad human nature theodicy for
neutralizing the evidence from conceivability against her view, the bad human nature
theodicy constitutes a theological determinist adaptation of Plantinga’s original
Molinist theodicy which is not clearly on worse footing than Plantinga’s original, when
the latter is conjoined with a leading libertarian explanation of the empirical evidence of
pervasive human wrongdoing. Besides this one libertarian account of this empirical
evidence discussed above, there may be others. Some of them may, when conjoined
with Plantinga’s original Molinist theodicy, produce a view that is more plausible than
the bad human nature adaptation of Plantinga’s theodicy. 31 This, however, is yet to be
seen. Until it is seen, I propose that it is not clear that it is less plausible to affirm the
existence of the facts that figure in the bad human nature theodicy than it is to affirm the
31 One proposal is to simply agree with the bad human nature theodicy that human nature is bad in the relevant
respect, but to propose that other creatable beings are not bad in this way. God could have created non-humans
that achieved freedom goods of collective exercises of significant control without committing moral evils. One
problem with this proposal has already been noted in a parenthetical comment in the text above. An additional
problem is as follows. Surely advocating this view does nothing to put Plantinga’s original theodicy in a better
position than the bad human nature theodicy. For, an advocate of Plantinga’s theodicy who embraces this view
will face the problem of explaining why God created bad humans rather than other, not-so-bad creatable
beings just as much as her theological determinist counterpart will.
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existence of the facts that figure in Plantinga’s Molinist theodicy. And so, this second
theological determinist adaptation of Plantinga’s greater moral goods free will theodicy
remains worthy of future consideration.
There are two ways, then, that theological determinists might fruitfully adapt
Plantinga’s Molinist theodicy: by adopting compatibilist Molinism and by adopting
the bad human nature theodicy. In neither case, it is clear that the resulting adaptation of
Plantinga’s theodiciy will be significantly less plausible than his original.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to make a significant contribution toward challenging a
received narrative in contemporary philosophy of religion that theists should adopt
libertarianism in order to respond to the problem of evil. I have challenged this
narrative by showing that three leading free will theodicies, all of which explicitly
affirm a commitment to libertarianism, can be adapted by theological determinists who
deny libertarianism in order to produce their own free will theodicies for a wide variety
of moral and natural evils. The theodicies I have examined are not an exhaustive
compilation of free will theodicies that explicitly appeal to libertarianism. I have not,
for example, engaged with free will theodicies committed to libertarianism which also
centrally involve a commitment to the claim that God does not know the future free
actions of creatures.32 Nonetheless, the theodicies examined are among the very most
influential free will theodicies involving an explicit commitment to libertarianism
which do not require denying God’s knowledge of the future free actions of creatures.
As such, the success of this paper should, at minimum, weaken the confidence of those
who affirm God’s knowledge of the future free actions of creatures that they should
adopt a libertarian theory of free action in order to adequately respond to the problem of
evil. At the same time, I hope it may invigorate investigation into the resources of
theological determinists in addressing the problem of evil.33
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